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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20060914-CA

v.
LORNA STALLINGS,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of
distributing or agreeing, consenting, offering, or arranging to
distribute a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a first
degree felony (R. 70-71).

This Court has jurisdiction over the

appeal pursuant to the pourover provision of Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3 (2) (j) (West 2004) . £ee R. 90; Utah R. App. P. 42(a).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Was the evidence sufficient to support a conviction for
distributing or agreeing, consenting, offering, or arranging to
distribute a controlled substance, where defendant was contacted
by telephone to sell cocaine to the target of a controlled buy,
showed up at the specified location to meet the target, and

1

participated in a drugs-for-money exchange with the target, who
then unwittingly turned the drugs over to the police?
A criminal conviction based on a jury verdict will be
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is uso
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that ^reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant
committed the crime."

State v, Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah

1994)(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)(West 2004), governing
prohibited controlled substances, provides:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it
is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(ii) distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute
a controlled or counterfeit substance.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one enhanced count of unlawfully
distributing or arranging to distribute a controlled substance, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(ii)(West 2004) (R. 1-2). A jury convicted her as charged
(R. 65-67).

The court sentenced her to a term of five years to

life in the Utah State Prison, imposed a fine of $100, and
recommended drug treatment while incarcerated (R. 70-71).
Defendant filed a timely appeal (R. 73) .
2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Working with the Weber Morgan Narcotics Task Force, Brian,
an experienced confidential informant, set up a deal to buy
cocaine from a woman named Ky (R. 93: 84, 86, 158).l

Ky was the

identified target of the controlled buy (Id. at 158) . Brian
phoned Ky, who told him to meet her at a Smith's parking lot in
Ogden (Id. at 86-87, 131, 133). Undercover Officer Grogan drove
Brian, who had been searched and wired with a monitoring device,
to the Smith's parking lot, where they met Ky, who arrived in a
car driven by her brother (Id^ at 86, 88, 113-15, 120). Ky did
not have drugs with her and so called defendant, arranging to
meet her at a nearby gas station and mini-mart (Id. at 86, 99100, 115-16, 134-35, 159). Ky had no idea that Grogan was a
police officer or that Brian was a confidential informant (R. 87,
143-44) .
Officer Grogan drove Brian and the unwitting Ky to the gas
station (Id. at 116, 136). Grogan handed Ky a $100 bill, and she
got out of his car with the bill in her hand and walked over to a
Pontiac that had just pulled into the parking lot.

Defendant was

the passenger in the Pontiac (Id. at 104, 117, 141, 162). Brian
testified that the transaction occurred "just really quick.

1

[Ky]

Brian completed 33 controlled narcotics buys while
working for the Weber Morgan Narcotics Task Force (R. 93: 107).
He undertook this work to distance himself from the drug culture
or, as he testified, to "burn my bridges" (Id. at 111). He was
incarcerated at the Salt Lake County jail at the time of trial
(Id. at 110).
3

was there maybe 30 seconds and she came back with the drugs'7 (Id.
at 118) .2

Grogan testified that although he did not see the

actual transaction, he did see defendant "hold the 100-dollar
bill up into the light as if inspecting it" (Id. at 163; accord
id. at 169, 174) .

A reluctant witness, Ky testified that she

approached defendant's vehicle and "[e]xchanged. . . . [m]oney
for dope" by dropping the money in defendant's lap and taking a
bag containing six individually-packaged rocks of crack cocaine
from defendant (Id. at 118, 142, 163). Ky returned to Grogan's
vehicle with the drugs in her hand (Id. at 118, 143, 163).

Brian

testified:
Yeah, she had them in her hand and she there was six packages of crack cocaine. And
she gave them to Officer Grogan, and then she
wanted to get some for getting the drugs,
kind of like the middleman type deal, so . .
. he gave me the drugs and I gave her [a]
little piece of one of the rocks or one of
the six packages I gave her, so there was
only five left, for getting it.
(Id. at 118; accord id. at 143, 165). 3
As soon as the transaction was complete, defendant left the
parking lot in the Pontiac (Id. at 92). Ky's brother, meanwhile,
had followed Grogan's vehicle to the gas station.

Ky left

2

Brian testified that he did not watch the actual
transaction because NN[i]t's not something that you like to deal
with to see who they're getting it from" (R. 93: 120).
3

Brian further explained that payment for the peison who
arranged a drug transaction was common: "They go out of their way
and get the drugs for you and they're like, I don't know, I don't
think she made money, so for doing it I gave her a little bit so
she'd have something" (Id. at 119).
4

Grogan' s car and drove off with her brother (Id. at 119-20, 165).
Another officer involved in the operation then radioed ahead to a
surveillance officer, who located the Pontiac.

After observing

the Pontiac's driver commit a traffic violation, the officer
stopped the car, identified both occupants, issued a warning, and
then let the car go (IcL. at 92, 179-80).
Neither Ky nor defendant were immediately arrested.

A

member of the Narcotics Task Force explained:
[W]e were doing numerous controlled purchases
in the Ogden area for the crack cocaine, it's
not unusual for us just to stop, get a person
identified and release them and then charge
them down the road. With that many people
and the people that Brian was working for us
with, we were not arresting those individuals
at that time. We let them walk, what we call
walk with our money. So we just get them
identified and we charge them down the road.
(Id. at 93). Eventually, officers arrested and charged both Ky
and defendant (Id^. at 109, 144).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support the verdict because a key witness was not credible and
because neither the undercover officer nor the confidential
informant observed the actual drug transaction.

Because

defendant has failed to comply with the marshaling requirement,
her claim need not even be considered.
however, it fails.

Even on the merits,

First, the burden of assessing the

credibility of the witnesses rests with the jury, not with the
appellate court.

Second, on review, this Court considers both
5

the evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
that evidence.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the jury's verdict, considering the fair inferences and
leaving all witness credibility determinations to the jury, there
can be no doubt that defendant knew what she was doing, intended
her actions, and took active steps to facilitate the completion
of a drug transaction.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT
THE CONVICTION WHERE DEFENDANT WAS
CONTACTED BY TELEPHONE TO SELL
COCAINE AND SHOWED UP AT THE
SPECIFIED LOCATION TO MEET THE
TARGET AND COMPLETE A DRUGS-FORMONEY EXCHANGE
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support a conviction for distribution of a controlled substance.
Br. of Aplt. at 7-8.

She contends that the evidence suggested

that Ky, rather than defendant, was the guilty party.4
13.

Id. at 7,

Moreover, she asserts that because Ky was a known drug

addict and convicted felon, her testimony implicating defendant
was inherently unbelievable.

Because neither the undercover

officer nor the confidential informant observed the actual drug
transaction and because Ky's testimony was "so improbable,"

4

By suggesting that Ky rather than defendant was the
guilty party, defendant has framed her argument as an "either/or
proposition. See Br. of Aplt. at 7. The statutory crime,
however, encompasses both distribution and acts prepatory to
distribution. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). Where
defendant supplied the cocaine and Ky acted as middleman, both
defendant and Ky could be culpable under the statute.
6

defendant concludes that a reasonable jury necessarily would have
entertained a reasonable doubt and acquitted her.

Id. at 7-8,

12-13.
At the outset, although defendant refers to the marshaling
requirement, she fails to "fully embrac[e] the [State's]
position."

State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 117, 124 P.3d 235; Utah

R. App. P. 24(a)(9)(articulating marshaling requirement).

She

does not engage in the process of meaningfully gathering the
evidence supporting the jury's verdict and demonstrating how it
necessarily falls short of supporting the jury's verdict.

See

State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990)(adopting
marshaling requirement for sufficiency challenge to jury
verdict).

For this reason alone, defendant's claim may be

rejected.
Even if this Court chooses to reach the merits, defendant
fares no better.

A reviewing court will reverse a criminal

conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the evidence is so
lacking that "reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt" that defendant committed the crime.

State v. Petree, 659

P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on other grounds, State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987).

However, u[w]here there

is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from it, from which findings of all the elements of the
crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, [the court's]

7

inquiry is complete and [it] will sustain the verdict."

State v.

Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989).
The statute under which defendant was convicted provides
that "it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally distribute . . . or . . . agree, consent, offer or
arrange to distribute a controlled . . . substance."
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) (West 2004).
this statute is clear.

Utah Code

The caselaw interpreting

All that is necessary to establish the

offense is a knowing or intentional mental state along with an
offer or arrangement to distribute drugs.

State v. Harrison, 601

P.2d 922, 924 n.5 (Utah 1979).
Intent to commit the crime, usually not susceptible to
direct proof, can be inferred from defendant's actions or from
surrounding circumstances.5
110, 988 P.2d 949.

State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,

As to the act of offering or arranging to

distribute a controlled substance, "any witting or intentional
lending of aid in the distribution of drugs, whatever form it
takes, is proscribed by the act."

Harrison, 601 P.2d at 923;

accord State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, M

9-10, 3 P.3d 725;

State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah App 1990); State v.

5

Proof of an actual sale can be helpful in establishing
knowledge or intent but is not a necessary element of the crime.
State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, 112, 3 P.3d 725 (citing cases
in which, "[e]ven absent proof of a completed distribution, . . .
[other types of evidence] reveal the defendant's intent by
showing that the defendant took active steps to facilitate the
completion of an illicit transaction").
8

Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Utah 1986).

Thus, if defendant

serves as "one link in a chain of events • . . which eventually
led to the sale of [an unlawful controlled substance]," he is
culpable under the statute.

Pelton, 801 P.2d at 185.

Applying the law to the facts, defendant's claim fails for
two reasons.

First, defendant neglects the role of the jury in

assessing the credibility of witnesses.

The law is well-settled

that "determinations of witness credibility are left to the jury.
The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any
witness's testimony."

State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah

App. 1993) (citing State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 904-05 (Utah App.
1990)).
When the evidence presented is conflicting or
disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive
judge of both the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given particular
evidence. Ordinarily, a reviewing court may
not reassess credibility or reweigh the
evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the
evidence in favor of the jury verdict.
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) (citations
omitted).

This Court is not positioned to second-guess the

jury's assessment of Ky's credibility.

Ky did indeed testify

that when the parties met at the gas station, their cars were
positioned differently than Officer Grogan testified.
93: 150 with R. 93: 161.

Compare R.

She also testified that she stood by

defendant's vehicle when buying the drugs while Grogan testified
that she sat in the back seat.
175).

Compare id. at 149 with id. at

Minor inconsistencies or contradictions in a witness's
9

testimony, however, will not warrant reversal based on
insufficient evidence.
App. 1998).

State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 809 (Utah

Notably, there was no testimonial inconsistency

about the gist of the transaction - that Ky gave defendant a $100
bill, and that defendant gave Ky six rocks of cocaine in exchange
for the money.

The jury chose to believe this evidence, and this

Court accords deference to that determination.
Second, defendant's claim fails because she neglects to give
deference to the fair inferences that arise from the facts.
Gardner, 789 P.2d at 285.

See

While defendant contends that the

evidence was insufficient because neither Officer Grogan nor
Brian observed the actual transaction, she fails to credit the
inferences that reasonably arise from the evidence before the
jury.

As to the element of intent, the evidence and its fair

inferences amply support that defendant knew what she was doing
and that she acted intentionally.

Defendant responded to a call

from Ky that she "need[ed] a C note," she appeared at the
location Ky specified, she met briefly with Ky, and she left
immediately thereafter (R. 93: 135, 149, 162-63).

Defendant and

Ky had known each other for "years" and communicated the quantity
of drugs sought with the term "C note," which fairly implies
defendant's familiarity with and involvement in the drug culture
(Id. at 131, 149). There is neither evidentiary nor inferential
support for a claim that defendant went to the gas station

10

parking lot for any reason other than to conduct a drug
transaction with Ky.6
As to the act of arranging to distribute a controlled
substance, Ky telephoned defendant in order to get drugs to sell
to Brian (R. 93: 135, 162). When defendant showed up shortly
thereafter, Ky walked over to her with a $100 bill, and returned
less than a minute later with six rocks of cocaine7 (Id. at 118,
142, 162-63).

Ky never put her hands in her pockets or otherwise

concealed what she was giving to or receiving from defendant (Id.
at 118, 143, 162, 170). The fair inference arising from this
testimony is that Ky took the money to defendant and that, in
exchange for it, defendant gave Ky the six rocks of cocaine.
Moreover, the undercover officer saw defendant hold the $100 bill
up to the light, as if to assess whether it might be counterfeit
(Id. at 163, 169, 173). The fair inference from this act is that
defendant wanted to ensure that she was receiving fair value in
exchange for the cocaine she was giving to Ky.

Moreover, once

back in Grogan's vehicle, Ky asked the men for some cocaine,
which both Grogan and Brian explained was typical payment within
the drug culture for arranging a drug sale (Id. at 118-19, 164-

6

Ky unequivocally denied that she had ever owed defendant
any money, as defense counsel suggests on appeal. See Br. of
Aplt. at 13; R. 93: 146, 148.
7

Defendant frames her argument largely as a response to a
charge only of distribution. See Br. of Aplt. at 7-8. In fact,
defendant was charged with distribution or, in the alternative,
with agreeing, consenting, offering, or arranging to distribute a
controlled substance. R. 1-2.
11

65).

Inferentially, then, this testimony corroborates that

defendant sold Ky cocaine for $100.

Otherwise, Ky would not have

asked for her "cut" for arranging the sale.
In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict, considering the fair inferences,
and leaving all determinations of witness credibility to the
jury, the evidence sufficed to conclude that defendant knew what
she was doing, intended her actions, and took active steps to
facilitate the completion of a drug transaction.

No more is

necessary to sustain her conviction.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on one count of distributing or arranging to
distribute a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a first
degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Jj_

day of May, 2007.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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